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Improving the N-Version Programming Process
Through the Evolution of a Design Paradigm
Introduction
The N-Version Programming (NVP) approach achieves fault-tolerant software systems, called N-Version Software (NVS) systems, through the development and use of design diversity [1] .
Such systems are normally operated on an N-Version Executive (NVX) environment [2] . Since the idea of NVP was first proposed in [3] , numerous papers were published in either modeling NVS systems [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10], or providing empirical studies of NVS systems [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . The effectiveness of the NVP approach, however, has remained highly controversial and inconclusive. Nevertheless, most researchers and practitioners agree that a high degree of version independency and a low probability of failure correlation would play the key role in determining the success of an NVS deployment.
To maximize the effectiveness of the NVP approach, the probability of similar errors that coincide at the NVS decision points must be reduced to the lowest possible value. To achieve this key element for NVS, a rigorous NVP development paradigm was proposed in [19] . This effort included the foundation of disciplined practices in modern software engineering techniques, and the incorporation of recent knowledge and experience obtained from fault-tolerant system design principles. The main purpose of this design paradigm was to encourage the investigation and implementation of NVS techniques for practical applications.
The first application of this design paradigm to a real-world project was reported in [18] for an extensive evaluation. Some limitations were also be presented in [20] , leading to a couple of refinements to the design paradigm. To observe the impact of the revised NVP development paradigm, a similar project was conducted at the University of Iowa and the Rockwell International. This paper describes a comprehensive report on the application of the design paradigm to this project and the results. In Section 2, we examine the NVP design paradigm and its refinement. Section 3 describes the University of Iowa/Rockwell NVS project. The three following Sections give a thorough evaluation of the resulting NVS product, including program metrics and statistics (Section 4), operational testing and NVS reliability evaluation (Section 5), and mutation testing for a coverage analysis of the NVS systems (Section 6). Section 7 compares this experiment with three previous experiments in [16] [17] [18] . Conclusions of this paper are provided in Section 8.
An NVP Design Paradigm and Refinement
NVP has been defined as "the independent generation of N ≥ 2 functionally equivalent programs from the same initial specification [3] ." "Independent generation" meant that the programming efforts were to be carried out by individuals or groups that did not interact with respect to the programming process. The NVP approach was motivated by the "fundamental conjecture that the independence of programming efforts will greatly reduce the probability of identical software faults occurring in two or more versions of the program [3] ."
The key NVP research effort has been addressed to the formation of a set of guidelines for systematic design approach to implement NVS systems, in order to achieve efficient tolerance of design faults in computer systems. The gradual evolution of these rigorous guidelines and techniques was formulated in [19] as an NVS design paradigm by integrating the knowledge and experience obtained from both software engineering techniques and fault tolerance investigations. The word "paradigm" means "pattern, example, model," which refers to a set of guidelines and rules with illustrations.
The objectives of the design paradigm are:
(1) to reduce the possibility of oversights, mistakes, and inconsistencies in the process of software development and testing;
(2) to eliminate most perceivable causes of related design faults in the independently generated versions of a program, and to identify causes of those which slip through the design process; (3) to minimize the probability that two or more versions will produce similar erroneous results that coincide in time for a decision (consensus) action of an NVX environment.
The application of a proven software development method, or of diverse methods for individual versions, remains the core of the NVP process. This process is supplemented by procedures that aim: (1) to attain suitable isolation and independence (with respect to software faults) of the N concurrent version development efforts, (2) to encourage potential diversity among the multiple versions of an NVS system, and (3) to elaborate efficient error detection and recovery mechanism. The first two procedures serve to reduce the chances of related software faults being introduced into two or more versions via potential "fault leak" links, such as casual conversations or mail exchanges, common flaws in training or in manuals, use of the same faulty compiler, etc.
The last procedure serves to increase the possibilities of discovering manifested errors before they are converted to coincident failures. Figure 1 describes the current NVP paradigm for the development of NVS.
In Figure 1 , the NVP paradigm is composed of two categories of activities. The first category, represented by boxes and single-line arrows at the left-hand side, contains typical software development procedures. The second category, represented by ovals and double-line arrows at the right-hand side, describes the concurrent enforcement of various fault-tolerant techniques under the N-version programming environment. Table 1 summarizes the activities and guidelines incorporated in each phase of software development life cycle [19] . This design paradigm has been revised according to the experience of its execution in [18] , where the corresponding amendments are shown in italics in Table 1 .
These modifications do not show dramatic changes from the original paradigm. Nevertheless, they are important in avoiding two types of specification-related faults: one is the absence of appropriate responses to specification updates, and the other is the incorrect handling of matching features required by an NVX environment (e.g., the placement of voting routines). The following subsections describe how the revised NVP design paradigm was applied in conducting this project and the resulting project characteristics.
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NVS Supervision Environment
The operational environment for the application was conceived as airplane/autopilot interacting in a simulated environment. Three or five channels of diverse software independently computed a surface command to guide a simulated aircraft along its flight path. To ensure that significant command errors could be detected, random wind turbulences of different levels were superimposed in order to represent difficult flight conditions. The individual commands were recorded and compared for discrepancies that could indicate the presence of faults.
The configuration of a 3-channel flight simulation system (shown in Figure 2 
Design Diversity Investigations
Independent programming teams were the baseline design diversity investigated for this project.
It was noticed, however, the programming teams represented a wide range of experiences, from very experienced programmers (and/or avionics engineers) to novice ones. Moreover, three programming environments were provided to the programmers: one was located at the Iowa Computer-Aided Engineering Network (ICAEN) Center, another was located at the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering computing facility, and the other was provided by the Rockwell computing facilities. Every programming team was required to use the C programming language for the coding of the application.
It was hypothesized that different programming environments provided different hardware platforms, working atmosphere, and computing tools and facilities which could add further diversity for the development of the software project.
High Quality Specification with Error Detection and Recovery
The efforts to develop a specification that would be suitable for the programming teams started early in 1987, which was initially used in the Six-Language Project. During software generation in the Six-Language Project, many errors and ambiguities in the specification were revealed. The two specification defects resulting in two pairs of identical faults were carefully corrected. Moreover, A comprehensive error detection and recovery algorithm was imposed on the specification to specify two input routines, seven vote routines to cross check data, and one recovery routine to provide recovery when necessary. These enhancements were carefully specified and inserted in the original specification.
The final specification was restored to a single document [21] which was given to the 15 programming teams to independently develop their program versions in this project. This specification document has benefited from the scrutiny of more than 16 motivated programmers and researchers. This version of specification followed the principle of supplying only minimal (i.e., only absolutely necessary) information to the programmers, so as not to unwillingly bias the programmers' design decisions and overly restrict the potential design diversity. Throughout the program development phase, the specification was maintained as consistent and precise as possible.
NVP Communication Protocol
This project strictly required the programmers not to discuss any aspect of their work with members of other teams. Work-related communications between programmers and a project coordinator were conducted only via electronic mail. The programmers directed their questions to the project coordinator who was very familiar with the NVP process and the specification details.
The project coordinator responded to each message very quickly, usually with a turnaround time of less than 24 hours. The purpose of imposing this isolation rule on programming teams was to assure the independent generation of programs, which meant that programming efforts were carried out by individuals or groups that did not interact with respect to the programming process.
In the communication protocol, each answer was only sent to the team that submitted the corresponding question. The answer was broadcast to all teams only if the answer led to an update or clarification of the specification. During the software development process, a total of 145 questions were raised by and replied to individual programming teams, among which 11 specification-related message were broadcast for specification changes. In summary, the individual teams received an average of only 20 messages during the program development phase, contrasting to an average of 58 messages in the Six-Language Project and an average of over 150 messages in an NASA Experiment [17] . Also as a lesson learned from the Six-Language Project, each program version was carefully verified to comply with all the broadcast specification updates before its final acceptance.
NVS Software Development Schedule
The software development for this project was scheduled and conducted in six phases:
(
1) Initial design phase (4 weeks):
The purpose of this phase was to allow the programmers to get familiar with the specified problem, so as to design a solution to the problem. At the end of this four-week phase, each team delivered a preliminary design document, which followed specific guidelines and formats for documentation.
(2) Detailed design phase (2 weeks):
The purpose of this phase was to let each team obtain some feedbacks from the coordinator to adjust, consolidate, and complete their final design. The feedbacks were regarding to the feasibility and style of each design rather than any technical corrections, except under the situation where the design did not comply with the specification updates. Each team was also requested to conduct one or several design walkthroughs. At the end of this two-week phase, each team delivered a detailed design document and a design walkthrough report.
(3) Coding phase (3 weeks):
By the end of this 3-week phase, programmers had finished coding, conducted a code walkthrough by themselves, and delivered the initial code which was compilable. From this moment on, each team was required to use the revision control tool RCS (or to include CVS for concurrent versions) to do configuration management of their program modules. Code update report forms were also distributed to record every change that was made after the code was generated.
(4) Unit testing phase (1 week):
Each team was supplied with sample test data sets for each module to check the basic functionality of that module. They were also required to build their own test harness for this testing purpose. A total of 133 data files was provided to the programmers. These data sets were the same as those in the Six-Language Project.
(5) Integration testing phase (2 weeks):
Four sets of partial flight simulation test data, together with an automatic testing routine, were provided to each programming team for integration testing. This phase of testing was intended to guarantee that the software was suitable for a flight simulation environment in an integrated system. These data sets were the same as those in the Six-Language Project.
(6) Acceptance testing phase (2 weeks):
Programmers formally submitted their programs for a two-step acceptance test. In the first step (AT1), each program was run in a test harness of four nominal flight simulation profiles. These data sets provided the same coverage as those in the Six-Language Project.
For the second step (AT2), one extra simulation profile, representing an extremely difficult flight situation, was imposed. When a program failed a test, it was returned to the programmers for debugging and resubmission, along with the input case on which it failed. In summary, there were 23930 executions imposed on these programs before they were accepted and subjected to the final evaluation in the following stage. By the end of this two week phase, 12 programs passed the acceptance test successfully and were used in the following evaluations. Table 2 gives several comparisons of the 12 versions (identified by a Greek letter) with respect to some common software metrics. The objective of software metrics is to evaluate the quality of the product in a quality assurance environment. However, our focus here is the comparison among the program versions, since design diversity is our major concern.
Program Metrics and Statistics
The following metrics are considered in Table 2 : (1) A total of 96 faults was found and reported during the whole life cycle of the project.
Classification of faults according to fault types is shown in Table 3 . This category considers the following type of faults [19] : (1) typographical (a cosmetic mistake made in typing the program);
(2) error of omission (a piece of required code was missing); (3) incorrect algorithm (a deficient implementation of an algorithm); (4) specification misinterpretation (a misinterpretation of the specification); and (5) specification ambiguity (an unclear or inadequate specification which led to a deficient implementation). In this category, items (1) through (3) are implementation-related faults, while items (4) and (5) are specification-related faults. It is also noted that "incorrect algorithm" of item (3) is the most frequent fault type, which includes miscomputation, logic fault, initialization fault, and boundary fault. This result was similar to that observed in the Six-Language
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Operational Testing and NVS Reliability Evaluation
During the operational testing phase, 1000 flight simulations, or over five million program executions, were conducted. Only one fault (in the β version) was found during this operational testing phase.
To measure the reliability of the NVS system, we took the program versions which passed the Acceptance Test
Step 1 for study. The reason behind this was that had the Acceptance Test not included an extreme situation of Step 2, more faults would have remained in the program versions. It would be interesting to see how the remaining faults would be manifested in this application, and how they would or would not be tolerated during the NVS operation. Table 7 : Errors by Time in 3-Version and 5-Version Execution Configurations
From Table 5 we can see that the average error probability for single version is 0.1451 measured by case, or .00002747 measured by time. Table 6 shows that when measured by case, for all the 3-version combinations the error probability is .02136 (categories 3 and 4), an improvement over the single version by 7. In all the combinations of 5-version configuration, the error probability is .01049 (categories 4, 5, and 6), an improvement of 14.
From Table 7 we see that when measured by time, for all the 3-version combinations, the error probability is .000002324 (categories 3 and 4). This is a reduction of roughly 12 comparing with the single version execution. In all the combinations of 5-version configuration, the error probability is further reduced to 0 since there was no incidence of more than two coincident errors at the same time in the same case.
If we carry the error comparison granularity further to define coincident errors as the program versions failing with the same variables and values at the same time in the same test case, then no such coincident errors exist among the 12 program versions, resulting in perfect reliability improvement in both NVS configurations.
Mutation Testing and Coverage Analysis
To uncover the impact of faults that would have remained in the software version, and to evaluate the effectiveness of NVS mechanisms, a special type of regression testing, similar to mutation testing which is well known in the software testing literature [24] [25], was investigated in the 12
versions. The original purpose of the mutation testing is to ensure the quality of the test data used to verify a program, while our concern here was to examine the relationship of faults and error frequencies in each program and to evaluate the similarity of program errors among different versions. The testing procedure is described in the following steps: (1) The fault removal history of each program was examined and each program fault was analyzed and recreated. (2) "Mutants" were generated by injecting faults one by one into the final version from where they were removed (i.e., a fault from the C program will be injected to the C program only). Each mutant contains exactly one known software fault. (3) Each mutant was executed by the same set of input data in the flight simulation environment to observe errors. (4) The error characteristics were analyzed to collect error statistics and correlations.
The difference between the mutation technique applied here and its original usage is two-fold:
First, we used real mutants, that is, mutants injected with actual faults committed by programmers, instead of mutants with hypothesized faults. Secondly, our purpose was to measure the coverage of N -Version Software in detecting errors during operation, not merely the coverage of the test data in detecting mutants during testing. In fact, when there are multiple realizations of the same application, test data is no longer the only means for fault treatment and coverage analysis. Study of the error correlations among multiple program versions offers another dimen-sion of investigation in mutation testing.
Using the fault removal history of each version, we created a total of 96 mutants from the 12 program versions. In order to present the execution results of the above procedure, let us define the following two functions for each mutant:
Error Frequency Function (for a given set of test data) − the frequency of the error being triggered by the specified test data set.
Error Severity Function (for a given set of test data) − the severity of the error when manifested in the system by the specified test data set.
An Error Frequency Function of version x mutant i for test set τ, denoted as λ(
number of executions total number of errors when executing test set τ on mutant x i
Since each mutant contains only one known fault, it is hypothesized that errors produced by that fault are always the same for the same test inputs [26] . This hypothesis is considered valid for all the mutants discussed here. Therefore, we can define an Error Severity Function of version x mutant i for test set τ, µ(x i ,τ), to be µ(x i ,τ) = Thus we can define an Error Similarity Function, σ(x 1 ,..,x n ), for a set of mutants {x 1 ,..,x n } and a test set τ, to be σ(x 1 ,..,x n ;τ) = 1 0 if the majority of (x 1 ,..,x n ) produce identical or similar errors in test set τ if the majority of (x 1 ,..,x n ) produce distinct errors in test set τ Based on these definitions, we obtained the Error Similarity Functions for populations of two versions. Table 8 shows the Error Similarity Function matrix for two-mutant sets. The complete layout of this matrix is 96 by 96, but since it is a sparse matrix (most entries are zero), we can reduce it by removing many of the zero entries. In fact, the two incidences of indistinguishable errors shown in this table result from the two pairs of identical faults discussed before. Analysis of three-mutant sets becomes much more tedious since a three-dimensional matrix will be needed. However, it should be similar to the analysis of two-mutant sets. The error similarity function of the three-mutant sets is also considered as a sparse matrix, since we have not seen any common errors affecting more than two mutants.
Based on the above measures, we can obtain another reliability-related quantity, safety coverage, which is important for assessing the effectiveness of fault-tolerant systems. Safety coverage factor is defined as the conditional probability of successful error detection or recovery, given that a fault has manifested itself in the system [28] . In NVS systems, the safety coverage factor depends on the similarity of errors, the severity of errors, and the efficiency of the recovery mechanisms to cope with such errors. Thus, we need to derive a quantitative definition for measurement.
Since our main interest here is the analysis of the program versions themselves, without losing generality, let us assume the NVS supervisory system does not introduce extra errors which corrupt program executions. As a result, the main contribution of the "leak" of the NVS schemes would be the error similarity defined previously. Now we may use the mutants we generated earlier as the sampling space to represent the condition that a fault has been created. Since this fault is assumed to be manifested into errors during program executions, the probability that it would be covered (or tolerated) is related to its error severity and its similarity to errors of other program versions. Consequently, the safety coverage factor of an n-mutant system (out of a total population m) with respect to the test set τ, denoted C n (τ), could be defined as:
For example, measured by the testing of 100 simulations (τ = { 100 data sets }), C 1 (τ) represents the safety coverage factor of single-version software:
Next, the safety coverage factor C 2 (τ) of a two-version system from our sample mutants is:
Furthermore,
Note that C 2 (τ) should indeed be greater than C 3 (τ), since it is known that 2-version systems are more capable of error detection than 3-version systems.
Evaluation of these safety coverage factors indicates an enormous improvement of N-version software over single-version software, which was similarly observed in the Six-Language Project [29] . It is important to note, however, that the coverage defined and measured here is limited to the particular mutant population and the 100 specific test data sets. We might argue that many of the faults injected in these mutants could be detected by a normal testing procedure. However, there is always a non-zero probability for each of these faults to slip through all practically applied testing schemes in another environment. As a result, sampling from this fault population is still valid, and the resulting measures are useful to provide an evidence for the effectiveness of NVS methodology to the assigned application.
Comparisons to Other Experiments
This project, guided by an evolving NVP design paradigm, revealed some major differences in the underlying process and the resulting product comparing with other similar NVS experiments. Table 9 illustrates an overall comparison between this project and three other NVS experiments:
The Knight-Leveson Experiment [16] , the NASA Experiment [17] , and the Six-Language Project [18] . It is clear that the quality of the programs obtained in this project and the associated NVS reliability improvement were superior to those achieved in the previous experiments. In evaluating the differences among these NVS development projects, we noticed that the U. of Iowa/Rockwell Project took advantages of the previous projects in many aspects:
(1) A more diversified background of students (from academia and industry, in both areas of electrical engineering and computer science) and working environment.
(2) A better specification which was less error-prone and less ambiguous.
(3) A better error detection and recovery mechanism.
(4) A coordinator who was more familiar with the NVS development protocol.
(5) A better validation policy to enforce specification updates. In summary, these improvements were all contributed by the refined NVP design paradigm and the experience learned in conducting the process associated with this NVP design paradigm.
Conclusions
In this paper we demonstrated the effectiveness of our revised NVP design paradigm in improving software reliability by the provision of fault tolerance. The selected application was a realworld avionics control system which performed tedious computation-intensive tasks under severe testing constraints. We described the design diversity investigations, the program development phases, the testing configurations, the program properties, and the operational testing results in detail. We also applied the idea of mutation testing to measure several other reliability quantities, and demonstrated the software reliability improvement of the NVS configurations over the single-version configurations. We also compared our findings with those obtained from similar experiments conducted previously.
No single software engineering experiment or product could make revolutionary changes to software development practices overnight. Instead, modern software engineering techniques
evolve through the refinement of software development processes gradually. We believe this will also be true for the fault-tolerant software techniques. Without a paradigm to guide the development and evaluation of NVS, software projects by nature can get out of control easily. The NVersion Programming design paradigm offers a documented process model which is subject to readjustment, tailoring, refinement, and improvement. Compared to previous NVS experiments, the U. of Iowa/Rockwell Project, which was conducted based on this evolving paradigm, confirmed that the NVS product improvement could come largely from the existence and improvement of the NVS development process. Only through the experience in this process evolution could we build up enough confidence in applying and managing the N-Version Programming techniques successfully for more practical applications.
